Detection engineering

I collect Windows and Sysmon telemetry, write Sigma rules, and run controlled attack simulations to check whether the expected alerts appear.

These projects document my work with telemetry collection, Sigma rules and attack simulation. The Active Directory write-up records attack stages and observed logs; detection claims require matching logic and validation.

Detection evidence

Explore the validation workflow, alert evidence and detection rules.

Validation run

Sentinel BAS ran ten Atomic Red Team tests on my lab host and matched each one to the alerts my SIEM raised, by ATT&CK technique, host and timing.

70%of tests detected

7 detected, 3 missed

  • ExecutionT1059.001PowerShellEncoded PowerShell commandDetectedin 0 s
  • PersistenceT1136.001Local accountCreate a new local userDetectedin 0 s
  • PersistenceT1547.001Registry Run keysRegistry Run key persistenceDetectedin 0 s
  • PersistenceT1543.003Windows serviceInstall a new serviceDetectedin 4 s
  • PersistenceT1053.005Scheduled taskCreate a scheduled taskMissedNo alert
  • Defense evasionT1070.001Clear Windows event logsClear the Security event logMissedNo alert
  • Credential accessT1003.001LSASS memoryDump LSASS memoryDetectedin 0 s
  • Credential accessT1558.003KerberoastingRequest SPN ticketsMissedNo alert
  • DiscoveryT1082System information discoveryDiscovery command burstDetectedin 21 s
  • ImpactT1490Inhibit system recoveryDelete volume shadow copiesDetectedin 0 s

Replay of a recorded lab run, not a live scan. A detection required a matching alert within 60 seconds. The 7/10 result applies only to these ten tests on this lab host; it is not overall ATT&CK coverage.

The Kerberoasting miss exposed a rule that could never fire: it relied on TicketEncryptionType, which the pipeline never extracted.

Full results in the SIEM case study

Projects

  • Detection engineering

    Custom SIEM + Sentinel BAS

    A custom Python SIEM paired with Sentinel BAS to validate detection rules, correlate alerts and investigate missed attack simulations.

    Case-study summary

    Problem
    Validate whether controlled attack simulations generate the expected SIEM alerts.
    Architecture
    Windows/Linux collectors → Python/Flask → SQLite → Sigma, correlation and guarded SOAR.
    My contribution
    Built the SIEM, Sentinel BAS simulations and alert-to-test matching.
    Tests
    Recorded ten Atomic Red Team tests; matched alerts by technique, host and time.
    Outcome
    Seven simulations produced matching alerts; three did not. A missing parser field explained the Kerberoasting miss.
    • Sigma
    • MITRE ATT&CK
    • Python
  • Purple team lab

    Active Directory Purple Team Lab

    An isolated Active Directory lab exploring credential abuse, lateral movement and domain compromise, with documented telemetry and defensive analysis.

    Case-study summary

    Problem
    Trace an intrusion from initial access to domain compromise and assess the available telemetry.
    Architecture
    Isolated Windows Server 2022 domain, member workstation and Kali attacker.
    My contribution
    Built the lab, reproduced the attack chain and documented defensive findings.
    Tests
    Controlled credential abuse, lateral movement, DCSync, Golden Ticket and SCP scenarios.
    Outcome
    Recorded Windows Security, Sysmon and OpenSSH evidence across the attack chain.
    • Active Directory
    • Sysmon
    • MITRE ATT&CK
  • Security engineering

    ARGUS

    ARGUS samples selected Windows persistence, process, privacy, USB, network and LSASS-handle signals. Coverage depends on the collector, permissions and optional helper; it is not a replacement for endpoint protection.

    Case-study summary

    Problem
    Develop a Windows assistant with explicit separation between AI-generated proposals and permission to execute actions.
    Architecture
    Svelte 5 / TypeScript HUD → FastAPI REST and WebSocket service → routing, authorization, action-bound grants and registered skills; separate voice workers.
    My contribution
    Developing the assistant, V2 HUD, agent kernel, Windows skills, monitoring and backend security controls.
    Tests
    The case study references public source code and documentation. Current Windows runtime test results have not been independently verified.
    Outcome
    Public Windows source release with voice, desktop workflows, bounded agents, a 3D state view and documented setup.
    • Python
    • Svelte 5
    • FastAPI
    • Windows

Write-ups

Sigma rules

Three of the rules from my SIEM, each mapped to the ATT&CK technique it detects. The full set is on GitHub.

  • Credential Dumping Tool ExecutionT1003 OS Credential DumpingCritical
  • Encoded PowerShell Command ExecutionT1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellHigh
  • Suspicious Access to Administrative ShareT1570 Lateral Tool TransferMedium

Read the detection logic All rules on GitHub

Techniques and tools

Sigma
The vendor-neutral format the SIEM’s detection rules are written in.
MITRE ATT&CK
Every rule and detector is tagged with the technique it detects, so coverage can be counted technique by technique.
Atomic Red Team
The attack techniques Sentinel BAS runs against the SIEM to check that each detection fires.
Sysmon
Windows telemetry from the Active Directory lab, where each attack path is mapped to what it leaves in the logs.
Attack-chain correlation
The SIEM links related alerts within a 60-minute window into a single chain.